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Abstract
A partition game on a rectangle is a two-person zero-sum game in which the rectangle is
partitioned into a 0nite number of regions and the payo2 function is constant in each region.
A special case with four regions is essentially Silverman’s game, which has been extensively
studied in recent years. In this paper, we examine three-part partition games where the boundaries
separating the regions are the graphs of two continuous functions. Various conditions under which
optimal mixed strategies and game value do or do not exist are found, as are optimal strategies
and value in case they exist. Some games of this type have in the classical game theory literature
been interpreted as continuous Colonel Blotto games. c© 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights
reserved.
Keywords: Partition games; Games on intervals
1. Introduction
An r-part partition game on a rectangle SI × SII, where SI and SII are intervals in
the set R of real numbers, is a two-person zero-sum game in which SI and SII are
the pure strategy sets for Players I and II, respectively. The rectangle is partitioned
by nonintersecting curves C1; C2; : : : ; Cr−1 into r regions T1; T2; : : : ; Tr , within each of
which the payo2 is constant. If Player I chooses x from SI and II chooses y from SII,
the point (x; y) lies in exactly one of the Tk . There are real constants 
1; : : : ; 
r such
that if (x; y) falls in Tk , the payo2 is K(x; y)= 
k ; i.e., Player II pays Player I the
amount 
k .
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The special case where r=4 with boundary curves y= x=T; y= x; y=Tx for some
T¿1 and payo2s (from bottom to top region) of −; 1;−1;  for some ¿0 is essen-
tially what is called Silverman’s game with threshold T and penalty . (In Silverman’s
game, points on the curve y= x have payo2 0.) Silverman’s game has been stud-
ied extensively by Evans [1] and by the present author, partly in collaboration with
Evans, W. Dow Rieder and Leopold-Wildburger, in a series of works culminating in
the monograph [2], which encompasses most of the earlier results. For references to
the intermediate works, see [2].
In this paper, we examine three-part partition games where the boundary curves
C1 and C2 are the graphs of continuous functions f1 and f2 on SI or subintervals
thereof. Although many of the results may well remain valid without this assumption,
we shall make the simplifying assumption that each of the three regions is connected.
Let SI = [a; b] or (a; b) and SII = [c; d] or (c; d). Provided that SI and SII are both
closed or both open, there is no loss of generality in assuming that
SI = SII = [0; 1] or (0; 1) (1.1)
and we make that assumption as well throughout the paper. For convenience, we assume
that both functions are de0ned on all of [0; 1] even if the function values are not within
[0; 1] for all x in [0; 1], and we assume that
f2(x) ¿ f1(x) throughout (0; 1): (1.2)
The payo2 in the middle region will be denoted by 
; that in the top region by  and
that in the bottom region by . We assume that

 ¡ min{; }; (1.3)
so that Player II prefers the middle region. Let the left and right endpoints of curve
Ci be Ai and Bi, respectively, i=1; 2.
As is to be expected, results sometimes depend on which region is assumed to include
C1 and which includes C2. Some results do not. Unless more is explicitly stated in
a theorem, we assume only that K(x; y)∈{
; } when (x; y)∈C1 and K(x; y)∈{
; }
for all (x; y)∈C2.
The classical example of Sion and Wolfe [3] of a game without a value is similar,
di2ering only in that the payo2 function takes a value intermediate to 
 and min{; }
on the boundary curves. This game, and some others which are strictly three-part
partition games, have been interpreted in the classical game theory literature as Blotto
games.
2. Games with optimal pure strategies
If the - or -region contains a vertical line segment extending from top to bottom
of the rectangle, it often, but not always, means that Player I has an optimal pure
strategy and the value of the game is either  or , as we shall see in the theorems of
this section and the next.
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Fig. 1. Fig. 2.
Theorem 2.1. Let SI = SII = [0; 1] or (0; 1).
(A) Suppose that the line segment {(x0; y):y∈ SII} lies in the -region. If either
¿ (2.1)
or
sup
x∈SI
f1(x) = y1 ¡ 1; (2.2)
then the game value V is  and pure strategy x0 is optimal for I. In case (2:1); every
strategy for II is optimal. In case (2:2) with ¡; every strategy y¿y1 is optimal
for II.
(B) Suppose that the segment {(x0; y):y∈ SII} lies in the -region. If either ¿ 
or
inf
x∈SI
f2(x) = y2 ¿ 0; (2.3)
then the game value is  and pure strategy x0 is optimal for I. If ¿  then every
strategy for II is optimal; and if ¡ but (2:3) holds; then every strategy y¡y2 is
optimal for II.
Proof. (A) By hypothesis we have K(x0; y)=  for all y in SII. See Fig. 1. If ¿ 
and y0 ∈ SII, then K(x; y0)6  for all x in SI, so V = , x0 is optimal for I and y0 is
optimal for II. If ¡ and (2:2) holds, and y0¿y1, then for every x in SI, K(x; y0)
is either 
 or , so K(x; y0)6 , and again we have V = , x0 optimal for I and y0
optimal for II. This completes the proof of (A).
The proof of (B) is like that of (A), with the roˆles of  and  reversed. See Fig. 2
above.
Similarly, if the 
-region contains a horizontal segment extending from the left to the
right edge of the rectangle, as in Fig. 3 below, Player II has an optimal pure strategy
and the game value is 
, as we show in the next theorem. Assuming that the graphs
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Fig. 3. V = 
. Fig. 4. ¡; no game value.
of both f1 and f2 actually extend into the rectangle, such a horizontal line will not be
an edge of the rectangle.
Theorem 2.2. Let SI = SII = [0; 1] or (0; 1). If for some y0 in (0; 1) the line segment
{(x; y0): x∈ SI} lies in the 
-region; then the game value V is 
 and the pure strategy
y0 is optimal for Player II. For Player I every strategy is optimal.
Proof. By hypothesis, K(x; y0)= 
 for all x in SI. Given any x0 in SI we have
K(x0; y)¿ 
 for all y in SII, so V = 
 and the assertions about optimal strategies
follow as well.
3. Games with a curve endpoint at a corner
When an endpoint of one of the boundary curves is at a corner of the rectangle
and the intervals SI and SII are open the situation is less simple. Consider the game
depicted in Fig. 4 above, with ¡. Were B1 lower on the right edge we know from
Theorem 2.1 that the game value would be , and were B1 further left on the top edge
the value would be . With SI open (or just not including its right endpoint), we’ll
see that no game value exists. There are four cases of this type.
Theorem 3.1. Let SI = SII = (0; 1).
(A) If B1 is at (1; 1) or A1 is at (0; 1); and ¡; then the game does not have a
value.
(B) If A2 is at (0; 0) or B2 is at (1; 0); and ¿; again no game value exists.
Proof. (A) Consider 0rst the subcase with B1 at (1; 1); as depicted in Fig. 4 above.
We show 0rst that Player I cannot assure an expected payo2 larger than . Let F be
a mixed strategy for I (in the form of a cumulative distribution function on SI), and
¿0. Let y0 = inf{y=f1(x): x∈ SI; 06y6 1}. (In Fig. 4, y0 = 0, but we do not
assume that A1 is on the bottom edge.) For y0¡y¡1 de0ne
w(y) = inf{x ∈ SI:K(x; y) = }: (3.1)
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Fig. 5. ¡; no game value. Fig. 6. = ; no game value.
Since f1 is continuous and f1(1)= 1 we have
lim
y→1−
w(y) = 1: (3.2)
Let PF(x) denote the probability which F assigns to the single point {x} in SI. For
pure strategy y, the expected payo2 E(F; y) against mixed strategy F satis0es
E(F; y)6[F((w(y))− PF(w(y))] + [PF(w(y)) + 1− F(w(y))]; (3.3)
whether the payo2 on the curve C1 is 
 or . Since
lim
x→1−
F(x) = 1 and lim
y→1−
PF(w(y)) = 0; (3.4)
we have E(F; y)¡ +  for y suKciently near 1.
Next, we show that II cannot assure an expected payo2 smaller than . Let G be
a mixed strategy for Player II and ¿0. We show that there is a pure strategy x for
which E(x; G)¿ − . Let PG(y) be the probability which G assigns to the singleton
{y} in SII. Then for x∈ SI, the expected payo2 E(x; G) of x against G satis0es
E(x; G)¿[G(f1(x))− PG(f1(x))] + 
[PG(f1(x)) + 1− G(f1(x))]: (3.5)
Since
lim
x→1−
f1(x) = 1; lim
y→1−
G(y) = 1 and lim
x→1−
PG(f1(x)) = 0; (3.6)
we have E(x; G)¿ −  for x suKciently close to 1. Thus, no game value exists in
this subcase.
The proof for the second subcase, with A1 at (0; 1); involves only slight modi0cations
of the above argument. One may now refer to Fig. 5 above. Let y0 be as before. In
place of (3:1) we de0ne for y0¡y¡1
v(y) = sup{x ∈ SI:K(x; y) = }: (3.7)
Then, in place of (3:2) we have
lim
y→1−
v(y) = 0 (3.8)
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and the expected payo2 of F against pure strategy y satis0es
E(F; y)6F(v(y)) + [1− F(v(y))]: (3.9)
It follows again that E(F; y)¡ +  for y suKciently near to 1.
Given a mixed strategy G for Player II, inequality (3:5) holds as before. In place of
(3:6) we now have
lim
x→0+
f1(x) = 1; lim
y→1−
G(y) = 1 and lim
x→0+
PG(f1(x)) = 0 (3.10)
and it follows that E(x; G)¿−  for x suKciently near 0.
(B) The proof of B is similar, and we leave the details to the reader.
If SI and SII are closed, the situation depends on the payo2 at the corner point in
question. In the situation of Fig. 4, for example, if K(1; 1)=  then Player I wins 
with pure strategy 1; and V = . If K(1; 1)= 
, the situation is like that in Theorem
3.1 and no value exists. We leave these cases for the interested reader to explore
further.
Suppose now that A2 is at (0; 0); B1 is at (1; 1) and A1 and B2 are properly contained
in the bottom and top sides, respectively, of the square, as in Fig. 6 above. It is
clear from Theorem 3.1 that if  = , no game value exists. We shall now show that
the same is true when = , provided that the abscissa at B2 is smaller than that
at A1.
Theorem 3.2. Let S1 = SII = (0; 1); and suppose that A2 is at (0; 0) and B1 is at (1; 1).
Assume further that x1¿ x2; where x1 and x2 are the abscissas at A1 and B2; respec-
tively. Then; no game value exists.
Proof. As remarked above, if  = , the result follows from Theorem 3.1. So, assume
= . There is no loss in generality then in assuming that = = − 
=1, for if
this is not the case we can arrange it by adding a constant to the game value and
rescaling.
We show 0rst that if ¿0, Player I has no strategy F for which E(F; y)¿  for all
y in SII. Let F be a mixed strategy on SI and ¿0. For y in SII, let
q1(y) = inf{x:y = f1(x)}
and
q2(y) = sup{x:y = f2(x)}:
By continuity of f1 and f2 we see that
lim
y→0+
q1(y) = x1;
lim
y→1−
q1(y) = 1;
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lim
y→0+
q2(y) = 0;
lim
y→1−
q2(y) = x2: (3.11)
Let PF(x) again denote the probability which F assigns to the singleton {x}. It is
clear that
in every open interval there are points x such that PF(x) ¡ =4: (3.12)
Now, whether the payo2 values on the curves C1 and C2 are 1 or −1,
E(F; y)6 1 · F(q2(y))− 1[F(q1(y))− F(q2(y))− PF(q1(y))]
+1[1− F(q1(y)) + PF(q1(y))]
= 2F(q2(y))− 2F(q1(y)) + 2PF(q1(y)) + 1: (3.13)
From (3.11) and (3.12) we see that in every neighborhood of 1 there is a point y1 for
which
PF(q1(y1)) ¡

4
and F(q1(y1)) ¿ 1− 4 : (3.14)
Similarly, in every neighborhood of 0 there is a point y2 for which
PF(q1(y2)) ¡

4
and F(q2(y2)) ¡

4
: (3.15)
Then
E(F; y1)6 2F(q2(y1))− 2F(q1(y1)) + 2PF(q1(y1)) + 1
¡ 2F(q2(y1))− 2
(
1− 
4
)
+

2
+ 1
6 2F(x2)− 1 +  (3.16)
and
E(F; y2))6 2F(q2(y2))− 2F(q1(y2)) + 2PF(q1(y2)) + 1
¡

2
− 2F(x1) + 2 + 1
= 1− 2F(x1) + : (3.17)
From (3.16) and (3.17) we have then
E(F; y1) + E(F; y2) ¡ 2[F(x2)− F(x1)] + 262:
Thus, at least one of E(F; y1) and E(F; y2) is smaller than .
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We complete the proof by showing that if ¿0, Player II has no strategy G for
which E(x; G)61 −  for all x in SI. Let G be a mixed strategy on SII and ¿0. If
x¡x2 then, regardless of which region(s) include the boundary curves,
E(x; G)¿ (−1)G(f2(x)) + (1)[1− G(f2(x))]
= 1− 2G(f2(x))
¿ 1− 
for x suKciently near 0.
There is a similar theorem with A1 at (0,1) and B2 at (1,0). We leave the details of
its statement and proof to the reader.
We examine next some cases where C1 and C2 meet at a corner. Suppose they meet
at the corner (0,0). If ¿ then Theorem 3.1 tells us that no game value exists. The
next theorem deals with the case where 6. For now we keep B2 to the left of
(1,1) and B1 below (1,1). (Theorem 3.8 treats the case where the curves meet again at
(1,1).) Observe that C1 has a maximum point in [0,1], and our earlier assumption that
the 
-region is connected together with B1 lying below (1,1) implies that the maximum
point of C1 is below the upper edge of the square.
Theorem 3.3. Let SI = SII be the interval (0; 1) and suppose that A1 =A2 is at the
point (0; 0). Assume that 0¡f1(x)¡1 for 0¡x61. If 6; then the game value
V = . Player I has epsilon-optimal strategies (given below in the proof); and for
Player II all strategies above the maximum point of C1 are optimal.
Proof. If y is greater than the ordinate at the maximum point of C1, then K(x; y)6
for all x. It remains only to show that for every ¿0, I has a mixed strategy F such
that
E(F; y) ¿  −  for all y: (3.18)
Observe next that if we enlarge the middle region, where the payo2 is 
, the expected
payo2 E(F; y) for a given F and y cannot increase. We may therefore, and do, assume
WLOG that the middle region is convex and symmetric with respect to the diagonal
line y= x, with its bounding curves strictly increasing, for if it is not we can expand
it to be so, as follows: First expand the region to be symmetric about the (0; 0) to
(1; 1) diagonal by adjoining all points (x; y) for which (y; x) was initially in the region.
Now replace the enlarged region by its convex hull. (The fact that f1(x)¿0 for x¿0
implies that this convex hull is a proper subset of SI × SII.) We then have f1 strictly
increasing on [0; 1] to [0; y1], where y1 is the ordinate of B1, and f2 is its inverse. See
Fig. 7 below.
For any continuous cdf F representing a mixed strategy for Player I, the probability
assigned to single points is 0, and for y6y1, the expected payo2 of F against the pure
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Fig. 7. 6.
strategy y is
E[F; y] = F(f1(y)) + 
[F(f−11 (y))− F(f1(y))] + [1− F(f−11 (y))]
= − ( − 
)[F(f−11 (y))− F(f1(y))]− (− )F(f−11 (y)): (3.19)
We now de0ne a bijection h of the interval (0; 1) onto (−∞; 0). Let y0 = 1; y1 =
f1(y0)= ordinate of B1, and in general for n¿1, yn=f1(yn−1). Since 0¡f1(x)¡x for
all x¿0 we have 0¡yn+1¡yn for all n, and hence l= lim yn exists. Also, l=f1(l),
so l=0. See Fig. 7 above. Let
h(y) = − y − y0
2(y1 − y0) for y16y ¡ y0: (3.20)
Thus, h(y0)= 0; h(y1)= − 1=2, and h maps (y1; y0)= (y1; 1) linearly onto (−1=2; 0).
Now extend h to all of (0; 1) by repeated application of
h(f1(y)) = h(y)− 12 : (3.21)
Then, for each integer n¿0, h maps the interval [yn+1; yn) in a strictly increasing
manner onto [−(n+ 1)=2;−n=2].
Given ¿0, let g be any continuous function which increases from 0 to 1 on (−∞; 0)
and satis0es
g(t + 1)− g(t) ¡ 
 − 
 ; (3.22)
for example, one may take g(t)= tanh(t=( − 
)). Now consider the cdf F de0ned
on the interval (0; 1) by
F(x) := g(h(x)): (3.23)
From (3.19) and (3.21)–(3.23) we have for y6y1
E(F; y) = − ( − 
)[F(f−11 (y))− F(f1(y))]− (− )F(f−11 (y))
¿  − ( − 
)[F(f−11 (y))− F(f1(y))]
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Fig. 8. 6:
=  − ( − 
)[g(h(f−11 (y)))− g(h(f1(y)))]
=  − ( − 
)[g(h(y) + 1=2)− g(h(y)− 1=2)]
¿ − :
For y¿y1 it is clear from Fig. 7 and the fact that ¿
, that E(F; y)¿E(F; y1), so
we have E(F; y)¿ −  for all y in (0,1), and the theorem is proved.
Theorem 3.3 may in fact be generalized to allow the common point A1 =A2 to lie
anywhere on the left edge of the square below the point (0; 1), as in either part of
Fig. 8 above.
Theorem 3.4. Let SI = SII = (0; 1) and suppose that A1 =A2 is at the point (0; c);
where 06c¡1. Assume that c¡f1(x)¡1 for 0¡x61. If 6; then the game value
V = . Player I has epsilon-optimal strategies; and for Player II all strategies above
the maximum point of C1 are optimal.
Proof. For Player II all strategies y6c are dominated, so the game reduces to a
game on (0; 1)× (c; 1), which transforms to the game of Theorem 3.3 by a linear
mapping.
There are three further cases similar to that in Theorem 3.3, described in Theorems
3.5–3.7. The proofs are similar, and will be omitted. (Alternatively, one may map
each of these games onto the 0rst by a combination of the mappings x→ 1 − x and
y→ 1− y.)
Theorem 3.5. Let SI = SII be the open interval (0; 1) and B1 =B2 be the point (1; 1).
Assume that A1 and A2 lie properly on the left and bottom edges; respectively; of the
square. If ¿; then the game value V = . Player I has epsilon-optimal strategies;
and for Player II all strategies below the minimum point of C2 are optimal (Fig. 9).
Theorem 3.6. Let SI = SII be the open interval (0; 1) and A1 =A2 be the point (0; 1).
Assume that B1 and B2 lie properly on the bottom and right edges; respectively;
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Fig. 9. ¿: Fig. 10. ¿:
Fig. 11. 6:
of the square. If ¿; then the game value V = . Player I has epsilon-optimal
strategies; and for Player II all strategies below the minimum point of C2 are optimal
(Fig. 10).
Theorem 3.7. Let SI = SII be the open interval (0; 1) and B1 =B2 be the point (1; 0).
Assume that A1 and A2 lie properly on the left and top edges; respectively; of the
square. If 6; then the game value V = . Player I has epsilon-optimal strategies;
and for Player II all strategies above the maximum point of C1 are optimal
(Fig. 11).
Note how the proof of Theorem 3.3 depends on the assumption that f1(x)¿0 for
x¿0. Fig. 12 below illustrates two cases where the proof of Theorem 3.3 fails. In
the 0rst, the expansion of the 
-region described in the proof yields the entire open
square, and in the second the function f1 which results after this expansion is not
strictly increasing. For the time being, we leave these cases unsolved.
In view of Theorem 3.1 it is clear that if both curves go from the lower left corner
to the upper right, and  = , no game value exists. But if = , the common value
is the value of the game, as one might guess from Theorems 3.3 and 3.5. This result
is particularly striking in that, although the area of the 
-region may be arbitrarily
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Fig. 12. (a) 6: (b) 6:
Fig. 13.
close to 1 and that of the - and -regions arbitrarily close to 0, the game value is
still .
Theorem 3.8. Let SI = SII be the interval (0; 1); A1 =A2 be the lower-left corner (0; 0)
of the rectangle SI× SII; B1 =B2 be the upper-right corner (1; 1); and = . Assume
that 0¡f1(x)¡1 for 0¡x¡1. Then the value of the game is V = = . Player I has
epsilon-optimal strategies; and every strategy for Player II is optimal.
Proof. We assume WLOG that = =1= −
. It suKces to show that for every ¿0
there is a mixed strategy F for Player I satisfying
E(F; y)¿1−  for all y ∈ (0; 1):
As in the proof of Theorem 3.3, we may and do assume WLOG that the mid-
dle region in the rectangle is convex and symmetric about the diagonal line y= x.
Again we have that f1 is strictly increasing and f2 =f−11 . Let y0 = 1=2: For n¿0, let
yn=f−11 (yn−1), and for n¡0; yn=f1(yn+1). Then yn=f1(yn+1) for all n in Z , and
we have limn→∞ yn=1 and limn→−∞ yn=0. See Fig. 13 above.
We de0ne a bijection h of (0; 1) onto (−∞;∞). For y0¡y6y1 let
h(y) =
y − y0
2(y1 − y0) ;
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so that h maps the interval (y0; y1] linearly onto (0; 1=2]. Then extend h to the rest of
(0; 1) by repeated application of
h(f1(y)) = h(y)− 12 : (3.24)
Thus, for each integer n, h maps the interval (yn; yn+1] in a strictly increasing manner
onto (n=2; (n + 1)=2]. Given ¿0, let g be a strictly increasing continuous function
which maps (−∞;∞) onto (0; 1) and satis0es
g(t + 1)− g(t) ¡ 
2
(3.25)
for example, g(t)= (1=2)(1 + tanh t=2). Now let F be the cdf de0ned on (0; 1) by
F(t) = g(h(t)): (3.26)
For any y in (0; 1), using (3.24)–(3:26) we have
E(F; y) = F(f1(y)) + 
[F(f−11 (y))− F(f1(y))] + [1− F(f−11 (y))]
= 1− 2[F(f−11 (y))− F(f1(y))]
= 1− 2[g(h(f−11 (y)))− g(h(f1(y)))]
= 1− 2[g(h(y) + 1=2)− g(h(y)− 1=2)]
¿ 1− ;
as desired.
4. Some games with discrete optimal mixed strategies
To avoid cases covered in Sections 2 and 3 we focus in this section on games
where 0¡f1(0)¡f2(0)¡1 and 0¡f1(1)¡f2(1)¡1. Thus, the 
-region extends from
the left edge to the right, and is not pinched o2 at either end; i.e., there is a number
r¿0 such that f2(x) − f1(x)¿r for all x in SI. It follows from (1.2) that the set of
distances between points of C1 and C2 has a positive lower bound, and consequently
that there is a positive lower bound on the lengths of horizontal line segments lying
in the 
-region and joining C1 to C2. Thus, there are always 0nite sets {y1; : : : ; yn} in
SII such that for every x in SI at least one of (x; y1); : : : ; (x; yn) lies in the 
-region.
De&nition 4.1. The crossing rank of the 
-region, or 
-crossing rank, is the smallest
integer n for which there exist {y1; : : : ; yn} in SII such that for every x in SI at least one
of (x; y1); : : : ; (x; yn) is in the 
-region. We call such a set {y1; : : : ; yn} an 
-spanning
set.
If the 
-crossing rank is 1, Theorem 2.2 applies, but games with 0nite 
-crossing
rank greater than 1 have not yet been treated.
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Theorem 4.2. Let SI = SII = (0; 1) or [0; 1]. Assume that the 
-region includes C1 and
C2 and that the 
-crossing rank is 2. Then the game value is
V2 : =
− 
2
 + − 2
 (4.1)
and

 ¡ V2 ¡ min{; }: (4.2)
Proof. We 0rst prove (4.2). By the symmetry in  and  there is no loss in generality
in assuming 6. Since  + − 2
¿0, (4.2) is then equivalent to

( + − 2
) ¡ − 
2 ¡ ( + − 2
): (4.3)
The 0rst inequality in (4.3) is equivalent to 
( − 
)¡( − 
) and the second to
0¡( − 
)2, so both are valid.
From the facts that n ¿ 1 and C1 and C2 lie in the 
-region it follows that
sup
x∈SI
f1(x) ¿ inf
x∈SI
f2(x):
Let (x1; s1) and (x2; s2) be points with s1¿s2; K(x1; s1)=  and K(x2; s2)= . Let
{y1; y2} be an 
-spanning set with y1¡y2. (See Fig. 14 above.) Let F be the mixed
strategy on SI which chooses x1 and x2 with respective probabilities
p =
 − 

 + − 2
 and q = 1− p =
− 

 + − 2
 (4.4)
and G the mixed strategy on SII which chooses y1 and y2 with respective probabilities
p and q as de0ned in (4.4). We shall show that F and G are optimal and V2 is the
game value by showing that
E(F; y)¿V2 for all y ∈ SII (4.5)
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and
E(x; G)6V2 for all x ∈ SI: (4.6)
We do (4.5) 0rst. If (x2; y) lies below C1 then y¡s2¡s1, and since (x1; s1) is below
C1, so is (x1; y). Thus K(x1; y)=K(x2; y)= , and E(F; y)= ¿V2. If (x2; y) lies in
the 
-region again we have y¡s2¡s1, so K(x1; y)=  and E(F; y)= q
 + p=V2.
If K(x2; y)=  then since K(x1; y)¿
 we have E(F; y)¿q + p
=V2, so (4.5) is
proved.
Finally, we show (4.6). Given x in SI, at least one of (x; y1) and (x; y2) lies in the

-region. If (x; y1) is there, then (x; y2) is either in the 
- or -region, because y2¿y1.
Thus, E(x; G)6p
+ q=V2. If (x; y2) is in the 
-region then (x; y1) is in the middle
or bottom region and E(x; G)6p+ q
=V2. This establishes (4.6) and completes the
proof of the theorem.
Let us now consider the game with 
-crossing rank 3, again assuming that the curves
C1 and C2 are included in the 
-region. Player II will use a mix of three pure strategies
{y1; y2; y3} constituting an 
-spanning set. Player I needs to mix three pure strategies
x1; x2 and x3 chosen so that only (x1; y1) among the three (x1; yi) lies in the 
-region;
only (x2; y2) among the (x2; yi) is in the 
-region, and only (x3; y3) among the three
(x3; yi) is there. Although Player I does not know the precise values that Player II
will choose as {y1; y2; y3}, this can be accomplished as follows. We assume at 0rst
that SI = SII = [0; 1], but will then show how to modify the choice if the intervals are
open.
For r in SI and s in SII, let V (r) be the intersection of the vertical line x= r with
the 
-region and H (s) the intersection of the horizontal line y= s with the 
-region.
Let (x1; s2) be a global minimum point on the curve C2 and (x3; s1) a global maximum
point on C1 for the interval [0,1]. Note that if {y1; y2; y3} is an 
-spanning set with
y1¡y2¡y3 then y16s2, for otherwise when x is near x1 all three (x; yi) would be in
the -region. Similarly, y3¿s1. Because the 
-crossing rank is 3 and the 
-region is
closed, H (s1)∪H (s2) is a closed subset of [0,1] which does not include all of (0,1). Its
complement in (0,1) is a union of some nonempty open intervals, which must include
some points x with V (x) lying above y= s2 and below y= s1. Choose any such x as
x2. See Fig. 15 below. Then
f2(x1) ¡ f1(x2) ¡ f2(x2) ¡ f1(x3): (4.7)
Now, what we say above about the complement of H (s1)∪H (s2) remains true with
s1 replaced by f1(x) and s2 by f2(x) for values of x suKciently near x3 and x1,
respectively, so if SI and SII are open and the minimum point of C2 or the maximum
point of C1 occurs only at an endpoint, we may replace x1 or x3 as necessary by a
value suKciently close to the corresponding extreme point so that the indicated choice
of x2 is still available.
We now examine possible expected payo2s against points x in SI for a strategy on
SII which mixes y1; y2 and y3 with respective probabilities q1; q2 and q3 (yet to
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be determined). If (x; y1) is in the 
-region, then (x; y2) and (x; y3) are in the 
- or
-regions, and the largest the expected payo2 could be is
E1 = 
q1 + q2 + q3: (4.8)
If (x; y2) is in the 
-region we may in the worst case have expected payo2
E2 = q1 + 
q2 + q3: (4.9)
If (x; y3) is in the 
-region the largest possible expected payo2 is
E3 = q1 + q2 + 
q3: (4.10)
To minimize the maximum expected payo2 we put E1 =E2 =E3, if this is possible
with all qi¿0 and q1 + q2 + q3 = 1. The solution of this system of equations is
(q1; q2; q3) =
1
u2 + uv+ v2
(v2; uv; u2); (4.11)
where u= − 
 and v=  − 
. The corresponding common value for the Ei is
V3 :=

v2 + (uv+ u2)
D3
=
v2 + 
uv+ u2
D3
=
(u2 + uv) + 
u2
D3
; (4.12)
where D3 = u2 + uv+ v2.
Theorem 4.3. Let SI = SII = (0; 1) or [0; 1]. Assume that the 
-region includes C1 and
C2; and that the 
-crossing rank is 3. Then the value of the game is V3 as given by
(4:12). An optimal strategy G for Player II is to assign probabilities (q1; q2; q3) given
by (4:11) to (y1; y2; y3); where {y1; y2; y3} is an 
-spanning set with y1¡y2¡y3.
Optimal for Player I is a strategy F which chooses x1; x2 and x3 as described in
the paragraph where (4:7) appears and assigns respective probabilities q3; q2 and q1.
Moreover;
V2 ¡ V3 ¡ min{; }: (4.13)
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Proof. We 0rst prove (4.13). We begin by obtaining some alternate expressions for
V2 and V3. With u and v as in (4.11) we have from (4.1)
V2 =
− 
2
 + − 2

=

u+ v
u+ v
=
(− u)u+ v
u+ v
= − u
2
u+ v
: (4.14)
By interchanging the roˆles of  and  in the above calculation we obtain
V2 =

v+ u
u+ v
=  − v
2
u+ v
: (4.15)
Similarly, from (4.12),
V3 =

u2 + (uv+ v2)
u2 + uv+ v2
=
(− u)u2 + (uv+ v2)
u2 + uv+ v2
= − u
3
u2 + uv+ v2
(4.16)
and
V3 =
(uv+ u2) + 
v2
u2 + uv+ v2
=
(uv+ u2) + ( − v)v2
u2 + uv+ v2
=  − v
3
u2 + uv+ v2
: (4.17)
From (4.16) and (4.17) we see that V3¡min{; }. Also,
u2
u+ v
=
u3
u2 + uv
¿
u3
u2 + uv+ v2
;
so it is clear from (4.14) and (4.16) that V2¡V3, and (4.13) is established.
We have seen in the discussion preceding the theorem statement that E(x; G)6V3
for all x in SI. We complete the proof of the theorem by showing that E(F; y)¿V3
for all y in SII. Let y∈ SII. If none of (x1; y); (x2; y); (x3; y) lies in the 
-region
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then E(F; y)¿min{; }¿V3. Suppose that K(x1; y)= 
. Then from (4.7) we have
y¡f2(x1)¡f1(x2)¡f1(x3), so K(x2; y)=K(x3; y)= , and
E(F; y) = 
q3 + q2 + q1 = E3 = V3
by (4.10) and (4.12). Suppose next that K(x2; y)= 
. Then f1(x2)¡y¡f2(x2), and
therefore, by (4.7) f2(x1)¡y¡f1(x3), so K(x1; y)=  and K(x3; y)= , and we have
E(F; y) = q3 + 
q2 + q1 = E2 = V3;
by (4.9) and (4.12). Finally, if K(x3; y)= 
, then again by (4.7) y¿f1(x3)¿f2(x2)¿
f2(x1), so K(x2; y)=K(x1; y)= , and
E(F; y) = q3 + q2 + 
q1 = E1 = V3;
by (4.8) and (4.12).
The results for 
-crossing rank 2 and 3 in Theorems 4.2 and 4.3 exhibit a pattern.
Using Pn and Qn for probability vectors in optimal strategies for Players I and II,
respectively, we have
Optimal strategies Game value
n=2 P2 =
(u; v)
u + v
; Q2 =
(v; u)
u + v

u + v
u + v
=
u + 
v
u + v
n=3 P3 =
(u2; uv; v2)
u2 + uv + v2
; Q3 =
(v2; uv; u2)
u2 + uv + v2

v2 + (uv + u2)
u2 + uv + v2
=
u2 + 
uv + v2
u2 + uv + v2
=
(v2 + uv) + 
u2
u2 + uv + v2
The pattern in optimal strategies is easy to see. One would predict that with 
-
crossing rank 4, P4 = (u3; u2v; uv2; v3)=(u3 + u2v + uv2 + v3) and Q4 = P˜4, where P˜
denotes the vector obtained from P by reversing the order of its components, and the
formula for general 
-crossing rank seems clear. If one works it out for rank 4 as in
the calculations of E1 to E3 preceding Theorem 4.3, one 0nds the common values of
the four corresponding expectations to be
V4 :=

u3 + (u2v+ uv2 + v3)
u3 + u2v+ uv2 + v3
=
(u3 + u2v+ uv2) + 
v3
u3 + u2v+ uv2 + v3
(4.18)
and now there is a clear pattern in the values V2; V3 and V4 also.
For the game with 
-crossing rank n we shall formulate the theorem only for the
case of monotone increasing boundary functions f1 and f2. Though we have little
doubt that the game value and probability vectors associated with optimal strategies
are the same without this restriction, we have not tried to formulate a prescription for
choosing the points x1; : : : ; xn in the general case. With monotone increasing boundary
functions Player I may choose the xi as follows. The case n=4 is illustrated in Fig. 16.
Choose x1 at or near 0, then x2 so that f1(x2) is slightly larger than f2(x1), then x3 so
that f1(x3) is slightly larger than f2(x2), etc. The “slightly larger”s need to be chosen
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small enough so that xn comes out less than 1, and this is possible because 
-crossing
rank n implies that the staircase path going horizontally from (0; f2(0)) to C1, then
vertically to C2, then horizontally to C1, etc., must, in its (n−1)th horizontal segment,
meet C1 without having reached the right edge of the square. The point xn will be
chosen somewhere between the abscissa of this intersection and 1. One sees then that
for each y in SII, at most one of (x1; y); : : : ; (xn; y) will lie in the 
-region.
Theorem 4.4. Let SI = SII = (0; 1) or [0; 1]. Assume that the functions f1 and f2 are
monotone increasing; the 
-region includes C1 and C2 and the 
-crossing rank is n.
Then an optimal strategy for Player I is to choose (x1; x2; : : : xn); as described in the
preceding paragraph; according to the probability vector
Pn = (p1n; p2n; : : : ; pnn) = (un−1; un−2v; : : : ; uvn−2; vn−1)=Dn;
where Dn=
∑n−1
k=0 u
kvn−1−k and u= − 
; v= − 
 as before. For Player II, choose
(y1; y2; : : : ; yn) according to the vector Qn=(q1n; q2n; : : : ; qnn)= P˜n; i.e.; the vector ob-
tained from Pn by reversing the order of its components; where {y1; : : : ; yn} is an

-spanning set with y1¡y2¡· · ·¡yn. The game value is
Vn :=
(

vn−1 + 
n−1∑
k=1
ukvn−1−k
)/
Dn =
(

n−2∑
k=0
ukvn−1−k + 
un−1
)/
Dn:
(4.19)
For each n¿1;
Vn = − u
n
Dn
=  − v
n
Dn
(4.20)
and

 = V1 ¡ Vn ¡ Vn+1 ¡ min{
; }: (4.21)
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Proof. Let F and G be the strategies prescribed for Players I and II, respectively. For
every x in SI; K(x; yk)= 
 for at least one k, and the expected payo2 E(x; G) will be
less than or equal to the maximum of
E1n = 
q1n + 
n∑
j=2
qjn
E2n = q1n + 
q2n + 
n∑
j=3
qjn
...
Ekn = 
k−1∑
j=1
qjn + 
qkn + 
n∑
j=k+1
qjn
...
Enn = 
n−1∑
j=1
qjn + 
qnn: (4.22)
Now qjn= uj−1vn−j=Dn, so
E1n =

vn−1 + 
∑n
j=2 u
j−1vn−j
Dn
= Vn;
and for 16k6n− 1,
Ek+1;n − Ekn = (q1n + · · ·+ qkn) + 
qk+1;n + (qk+2;n + · · ·+ qnn)
−(q1n + · · ·+ qk−1;n)− 
qkn − (qk+1;n + · · ·+ qnn)
= qkn + 
(qk+1;n − qkn)− qk+1;n
= (− 
)qkn − ( − 
)qk+1;n
= uqkn − vqk+1;n = 0:
Thus Ekn=Vn for k =1; 2; : : : ; n, and we have E(x; G)6Vn for all x.
Similarly, for every y in SII, we know that K(xi; y)= 
 for at most one xi, and
E(F; y) is greater than or equal to the minimum of
En+1;n = 
p1n + 
n∑
j=2
pjn
En+2;n = p1n + 
p2n + 
n∑
j=3
pjn
...
En+k;n = 
k−1∑
j=1
pjn + 
pkn + 
n∑
j=k+1
pjn
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...
E2n;n = 
n−1∑
j=1
pjn + 
pnn: (4.23)
Here pjn= un−jv j−1=Dn= qn+1−j; n, and we see that En+1; n=Enn; E2n; n=E1n, and in
general for k =1; 2; : : : ; n; En+k; n=En+1−k; n=Vn. Thus E(F; y)¿Vn for all y. It follows
that F and G are optimal, and that the game value is Vn. Note that the two expressions
for Vn in (4.19) are E1n and Enn.
To prove (4.20) write
DnVn = 
vn−1 + (uvn−2 + u2vn−3 + · · ·+ un−1)
= Dn + (
− )vn−1 = Dn − vn;
so
Vn =  − v
n
Dn
:
Similarly, using the En expression for Vn we obtain
Vn = − u
n
Dn
;
proving (4.20).
From these it is clear that Vn¡min{; }, since u and v are positive, and we have
seen earlier that 
=V1¡V2, so for (4.21) it remains only to prove that Vn¡Vn+1 for
all n¿2. But
Vn = − u
n
Dn
= − u
n+1
uDn
¡ − u
n+1
Dn+1
= Vn+1;
completing the proof of the theorem.
Observe that Theorem 3.8 is in a sense the case n=∞ of Theorem 4.4, and in
Theorem 3.8 we have = . If =  in Theorem 4.4, then u= v, and the game value
becomes
Vn =

un−1 + (n− 1)un−1
nun−1
=
1
n

+
n− 1
n
:
Then limn→∞ Vn= , which is the game value in Theorem 3.8.
If C1 is included in the -region, or C2 in the -region, or both, the game may or
may not have a value. We have not investigated all the possibilities here, but we close
this section with the following example where no game value exists. We are indebted
to Victor Baston for suggesting this example.
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Example 4.5. Let SI = SII = (0; 1) and = =−
=1. Let
f1(x) =
{
x + 0:25 if 0 ¡ x60:5
0:75 if x ¿ 0:5
and f2(x)= x + 0:5. Assume that C1 is included in the bottom region and C2 in the
top. We shall show that
(a) given a mixed strategy F on SI and ¿0; ∃y∈ SII with E(F; y)¡, and
(b) given a mixed strategy G on SII; ∃x∈ SI with E(x; G)¿0:2:
Thus, no game value exists.
For (a), note that for small 0¿0,
E(F; 0:75 + 0) = F(0:25 + 0) + 
(1− F(0:25 + 0))
= 2F(0:25 + 0)− 1:
See Fig. 17 above. Also, using PF(x) to denote the probability which F assigns to the
singleton {x}, we have
E(F; 0:5 + 0) = F(0) + 
[F(0:25 + 0)− F(0)− PF(0:25 + 0]
+ [1− F(0:25 + 0) + PF(0:25 + 0)]
= 2F(0)− 2F(0:25 + 0) + 2PF(0:25 + 0) + 1:
Then E(F; 0:75 + 0) + E(F; 0:5 + 0)= 2F(0) + 2PF(0:25 + 0)¡ for some 0 near 0. It
follows that at least one of E(F; 0:75+ 0) and E(F; 0:5+ 0) is smaller than , proving
(a).
For (b), let q1; q2; q3 and q4 be the probabilities which G assigns to (0; 0:5]; (0:5;
0:75); {0:75} and (0:75; 1), respectively. Then
E(0:25; G) = q1 + 
q2 + (q3 + q4) = 1− 2q2;
E(0:5; G) = (q1 + q2 + q3) + 
q4 = 1− 2q4:
If q260:4, then E(0:25; G)¿0:2. If q460:4, then E(0:5; G)¿0:2. Suppose then that
q2¿0:4 and q4¿0:4. Choose y0¿0:5 such that the probability assigned by G to
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[y0; 1)¿0:7, and let x0 =y0 − 0:5. Then (using PG(y) to denote the probability which
G assigns to the singleton {y}), we have
E(x0; G) = 1 · G(y0 − 0:25) + (−1)[G(y0)− PG(y0)− G(y0 − 0:25)]
+1 · [1− G(y0) + PG(y0)]
¿−[G(y0)− PG(y0)− G(y0 − 0:25)] + [1− G(y0) + PG(y0)]
¿−0:3 + 0:7 = 0:4:
Thus, in every case we have some x for which E(x; G)¿0:2.
5. Some open questions
Without trying to be comprehensive, we mention here a few possibilities for further
investigation. The game of Theorem 3.2 with x1¡x2 would appear to present an inter-
esting problem. Note that in the extreme case where x1 = 0 and x2 = 1 (and = ), we
have essentially Theorem 3.8 (if we also assume that 0¡f1(x)¡1 for 0¡x¡1). We
have not investigated the games of Fig. 12 and so we have not looked at all games
of the type considered in Section 3, where the 
-region includes one but not both the
curves C1; C2.
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